ABSTRACT
contrasted, while offering simple tips and best practices in identifying, evaluating, and solving these two common flowinduced issues.
A field case study utilizing pulsation and vibration measurements between a line heater and inlet separator for a gas plant will be presented and discussed. The case presents an opportunity to investigate mainline and small-bore piping AIV/FIV risks in plants, provides example data of clear AIV and FIV phenomena, and identifies complex situations that require more rigorous analysis. Advanced techniques for analyzing and solving complex issues that are commonly found in piping systems will be explored. Further, the case highlights the benefits of early screening and preventive considerations of upset conditions when dealing with flow-induced pulsation and vibration issues.
In this paper, the reader will gain an increased understanding of the importance of AIV/FIV in maintaining integrity of their facilities, and be provided with tools and knowledge to mitigate any risks that may be encountered. 
NOMENCLATURE

INTRODUCTION
The operator of an Alberta (Canada) gas plant contacted BETA Machinery Analysis (BETA) to evaluate a restrictive orifice plate (RO). The RO was located upstream of a separator (V-140), control valves, and many small-bore connections (Figure 1 ). The operator was concerned about the potential for noise and vibration created during the high flow relieving operating case.
BETA evaluated the risk of high vibration in this area by conducting an acoustic-induced vibration (AIV) study. The risk was found to be low. The operator wanted a follow-up field investigation, so BETA visited the site in August 2015. The field visit found some interesting pulsation results which indicated the potential for flow-induced vibration (FIV) issues. 
ACOUSTIC-INDUCED VIBRATION
In some cases, the gas in vessel V-140 needs to be sent to the flare; this is called the relieving case. In order to control the flow of gas to the flare, a restrictive orifice plate (RO) was installed upstream of vessel V-140 ( Figure 1 ). The relieving case would see the gas flow through the RO increase to 18.9E6 sm³/day [668 MMscfd] from the design flow of 4.2E6 sm³/day [150 MMscfd]. This will create significant noise downstream of the RO. This sound energy can also create unwanted vibrations of the pipe wall, and potentially cause fatigue failure of smallbore connections on the pipe.
An acoustic-induced vibration (AIV) audit was done using the procedure outlined in the Energy Institute "Guideline for the Avoidance of Vibration Induced Fatigue Failure in Process Pipework" [1] , also referred to as EI AVIFF. The risk posed by AIV is typically to downstream welds that are not circumferential, like stub-in branches, small-bore connections, and supports that are welded directly to the pipe. These are called welded discontinuities (WD). Axisymmetric welds, like the circumferential welds on pipe, rarely fail due to AIV.
The AIV study is broken down into two phases: Phase 1 was conducted on the RO and found the sound power level was acceptable (<155 dB) for the normal operating case but high (174 dB) for the relieving case. Phase 2 was conducted and found the LOF was acceptable for all the branch connections downstream of the orifice plate. If the AIV study had found issues, the solutions could either focus on lowering the sound power level, or changing the design of the downstream welded discontinuity (Table 1 above).
During the field visit, pulsation measurements were taken downstream of the RO (see Ch.22 in Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). Acoustic induced pulsations (AIP) are typically high frequency, broadband, and low amplitude, which is exactly what was observed (Figure 3) . The peak amplitude was very low (less than 0.05% of line pressure). 
FLOW-INDUCED VIBRATIONS
Also during the field visit, pulsation measurements were taken near the line heaters (H-135A and H-135B) upstream of the restrictive orifice plate (see Ch. 8 in Figure 2 and Figure 7) . The pulsations showed indications of FIV ( Figure 5 ).
Pulsations can be created in high-velocity gas systems by flow past the mouth of branch connections that contain zero flow ("deadlegs"). These pulsations are created by the interaction between vortices and acoustic resonances. An illustration of this scenario is shown in Figure 4 When taking measurements in the field, it can be difficult to do these calculations and determine the source of the pulsations. Piping systems typically have many deadlegs, any of which may potentially cause FIP. It can be useful to calculate the length of the deadleg while in the field, in order to start investigating the source of the pulsations. There tend to be multiple peaks (harmonics) created by FIP, and the difference in frequency between adjacent harmonics can be used to estimate the deadleg length. For example, from the pulsation measurement shown in Figure 5 , the top two adjacent harmonics occur at 95.9 Hz and 113.4 Hz. Reformatting Eq. (3) allows the calculation of the deadleg length:
Assuming a speed of sound in the gas of 396 m/s [1300 ft/s], the deadleg length can be calculated from Eq. (4) to be 11.3 m [37.1 ft]. The field analyst can now begin investigating the piping system to identify potential sources of the pulsations.
Typical solutions to FIV problems are listed below:
 Change the length of the deadleg (typically shorten it)  Avoid certain flowrates of gas  Allow some flow through the deadleg (typically a temporary solution while permanent solutions are developed and installed)  Add spoilers to the mouth of the deadleg to eliminate the creation of vortices  Add additional supports and bracing to reduce vibrations In this particular case, the piping system was complex, and finding which deadleg was directly responsible for the flowinduced pulsations (FIP) was difficult. Further investigation indicated that there are potentially multiple deadlegs contributing to FIP.
The peak pulsations near the line heater were plotted over the entire flow range (Figure 6 ). The area of the circles in the plot correspond to the pulsation amplitude of the peak. The maximum pulsations measured were 76.5 kPa peak-to-peak [11.1 psi peak-to-peak]. There are no industry guidelines for FIP but keeping pulsations less than 3% of line pressure or 225 kPa peak-to-peak [32.6 psi peak-to-peak] in this case, is recommended. The pulsations measured were below guideline.
The potential forces created by the flow-induced pulsations can be estimated by assuming a worst case situation of the pulsations acting on the cross sectional inner area of the pipe (Table 2 ). In general, BETA recommends pulsation-induced shaking forces to be less than 4448 N peak-to-peak [1000 lb peak-to-peak]. The worst case forces are acceptable. 
Figure 7. Piping upstream of orifice plate near line heater
In discussions with the owner, it was agreed that no modifications were required to deal with the flow-induced pulsations (FIP) that were measured. The reason was the pulsation and vibration levels were low and not predicted to get worse during the relieving case. Most gas piping system have deadlegs, and most piping systems with deadlegs will have FIPs at certain flow rates. Obviously not all piping systems have vibration problems, therefore some consideration of the pulsation levels should be included in the decision whether to make modifications.
SMALL-BORE CONNECTIONS
Vibration levels on the small-bore connections on the piping system were measured. The maximum vibration on the SBCs near the separator (V-140 in Figure 1 ) was 11.7 mm/s peak [0.46 in/s peak]. This is below BETA's vibration guideline of 25.4 mm/s peak [1 in/s peak] for small-bore connections and therefore acceptable.
The maximum vibration on the pressure sensor near the line heater (H-135B in Figure 7 ) was 4.1 mm/s peak [0.16 in/s peak] which is acceptable.
SUMMARY
Gas systems can have pulsations that are created by the piping system itself. These pulsations can cause vibrations and fatigue failure on the piping and small-bore branch connections. Acoustic-induced vibrations are created by pressure reducing devices like valves and restrictive orifice plates, and can cause CH.8 H-135B 
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